Feminist Reflections on the 'End' of the War on Terror by Heathcote, Gina
  1 
FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘END’ OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 
Feminist Reflections on the ‘End’ of the War on Terror 
GINA HEATHCOTE∗ 
This article examines the range of arguments articulated to justify the use of force under the 
‘War on Terror’. The three key justifications for unilateral force directed against terrorist actors, 
pre-emptive force, implied authorisation and the use of force to prevent terrorist actors operating 
from failed states, are demonstrated as analogous to domestic provocation excuses. As such, the 
article argues the ‘end’ of the ‘War on Terror’ has been in name only as the Obama 
Administration in the United States continues to develop practice in line with that of its 
predecessor. The analogy with domestic provocation excuses demonstrates weaknesses of 
contemporary US practice and of the pre-emptive force justification. Using a feminist 
understanding of the limitations of provocation defences and of the relationship between social, 
cultural, political and legal norms, the legacy of the ‘War on Terror’ is demonstrated as an 
assertion of a limited model of security that ignores the role militaries play in women’s insecurity 
and which limits women’s participation through the use of sexual stereotypes. The article 
concludes with a discussion of the range of feminist strategies that might be invoked to challenge 
the legacy of the ‘War on Terror’. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In March 2009, the United States Obama Administration replaced the 
language of the ‘War on Terror’ with the terminology ‘Overseas Contingency 
Operation’.1 In May 2010, the Obama Administration’s first National Security 
Strategy was published and the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive force appeared to 
be replaced by the language of cooperation and compliance with international 
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1
   After the change of administration in the US in 2009, the new Obama government initially 
announced the end of the ‘War on Terror’: see Oliver Burkeman, ‘Obama Administration 
says Goodbye to “War on Terror”’, The Guardian (London), 25 March 2009. However the 
use of force by the US against terrorist actors abroad has continued under the name of 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation’ and, after the arrest of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on 
25 December 2009, the Obama Administration increasingly referred to the global action 
against international terrorism. By March 2010, the Obama Administration acknowledged 
that ‘the United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qaida and its  
terrorist affiliates’: National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (May 2010) 19 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf> (‘2010 National Security 
Strategy’). 
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law on the use of force. President Obama emphasised, ‘[w]e are clear-eyed about 
the challenge of mobilizing collective action, and the shortfalls of our 
international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping outside the 
currents of international cooperation’.2 It is apparent that the era of semantics 
elaborating the Bush-style ‘War on Terror’ has ended. However, US action 
against terrorist actors continues, globally, in a fashion similar to the previous 
US Administration. 3  So while the articulation of a doctrine of pre-emptive  
force, central to Bush’s ‘War on Terror’, is notably absent from the Obama 
approach, the use of force against international terrorist networks continues in a  
pre-emptive fashion. In this article I use the term ‘global war against terrorism’ 
rather than the ‘War on Terror’ to accommodate the changing terminology 
utilised by the US government while acknowledging that the legacy of the ‘War 
on Terror’ continues to infiltrate US justifications for the use of force. However, 
I argue that the legacy of the ‘War on Terror’ is more than the continuation of 
pre-emptive force now labelled the ‘Overseas Contingency Operation’. An 
important legacy of the ‘War on Terror’ is the affirmation of a gendered 
international law and a continuation of a model of international relations ignorant 
of its gendered underpinnings.  
This article specifically reflects on the legacy of the Bush era’s ‘War on 
Terror’ for international law on the use of force. I argue that the pre-emptive 
force justification (the Bush Doctrine) is indicative of fundamental gendered 
fault lines in the international law on the use of force. I highlight a domestic 
analogy between the regulation of provocation defences under common law 
defences for violence and the pre-emptive force argument to demonstrate the 
gendered core of the law on the use of force. As international legal narratives 
shift away from the language of the ‘War on Terror’, we would do well to reflect 
on the legacy of the Bush Doctrine through the use of the ‘War on Terror’ as a 
strut to explore new strategies for challenging widespread assumptions about the 
role of military security as a route to human security. 
For citizens in Western communities, and undoubtedly many others, the date 
11 September 2001 is latent with meaning, history and, most likely, memories of 
where and how we heard, saw and reeled at the images of the terrorist attacks on 
New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. We now speak of ‘9/11’ in knowing 
tones as if some sense and understanding has been wrought from this violence. 
My own personal narrative of ‘September 11’ is filled with knowledge of births 
and deaths in an unfortunate collision of personal and public events.4 
Having been born on 11 September thirty years earlier meant that I began  
11 September 2001 with anticipation and excitement at the prospect of personal 
celebrations at a family gathering that evening. My sister had travelled across the 
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   National Security Council, 2010 National Security Strategy, above n 1, ii. 
3
   For a thorough discussion of the policy changes under Obama, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009’ (Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 09-43, Notre Dame Law School, July 2009) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144>. 
4
   Charlotte Bunch, reflecting on Western introspection, acknowledges ‘that 9/11 is not seen as 
a defining moment for the rest of the world — at least not in terms of what happened that 
day’ emphasising instead that ‘it has become a defining moment because of how it has been 
used. But the issues highlighted by 9/11 are not new and have been raised by many events 
both before and after it.’: Charlotte Bunch, ‘Whose Security?’, The Nation (New York)  
23 September 2002. 
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world to London to mark the occasion with me, which was generous of her and 
greatly welcomed by me. At my 29th birthday we had decided, across telephone 
exchanges, to celebrate my thirtieth birthday in New York. However, the birth of 
my second son stalled our more adventurous departure and we settled on a 
rendezvous in London. So, still reeling from the effects of new motherhood, I 
missed New York and planned to celebrate with my family in London. My son’s 
recent birth and my birthday were foremost in my mind as 11 September 2001 
dawned. A crying baby and a sleepless night were not about to inhibit an evening 
in a child-free restaurant, enjoying the luxury of a babysitter and someone else’s 
cooking. Instead the dinner became, for me, symbolic of the decadence of our 
culture as each of us wondered whether ‘total war’5 would be thrust upon us by 
morning. The streets of London were eerily deserted on the evening of  
11 September 2001, adding to the sense of fin de siècle. The day closed with the 
knowledge that my birthday now stood as ‘an exemplary day of male violence’.6 
When I reflect on that day, as equally as I remember the unspeakable scenes 
watched on a television screen in London, my memories are fused with the also 
unspeakable but vastly different trials I encountered as a mother fighting for the 
preservation of a public self. The world seemed to collude in definitions thrust 
upon me that I did not want or could not live out. I was tired, I was lonely, I was 
busy, I was sore, I was exhausted and I was, am, a mother. Like violence, 
childbirth and postnatal experiences often remain unspeakable aspects of our 
collective experience.7 Just as we do not launch into our understandings of the 
slow deaths inflicted upon Iraqi civilians through the destruction of civic 
infrastructure,8 nor do we discuss the painful, bloody, heroic labour of birthing. 
The connection between the two — violence and birth — are explored by Cohn 
as she describes the language used by scientists involved in the testing and 
development of the atomic bomb: 
There is one set of domestic images that demands separate attention — images 
that suggest men’s desire to appropriate from women the power of giving life and 
that conflate creation and destruction. The bomb project is rife with images of 
male birth … 
The entire history of the bomb project, in fact, seems permeated with imagery that 
confounds man’s overwhelming technological power to destroy nature with the 
power to create — imagery that inverts men’s destruction and asserts in its place 
the power to create new life and a new world. It converts men’s destruction into 
their rebirth.9 
                                                
 
5
  Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict (Lynne 
Rienner, 2002) ch 4. 
 
6
 Catharine A MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Harvard 
University Press, 2006) 260. See also Martin Amis, The Second Plane:  
September 11 — 2001–2007 (Jonathan Cape, 2008) 19, 49, connecting the masculine 
violence of the 9/11 terrorists with negation of female citizenship common to religious 
fundamentalism.  
 
7
 Robin Morgan, The Demon Lover: The Roots of Terrorism (Piatkus, 2nd ed, 2001) 68. 
 
8
 See Nuha Al-Radi, Baghdad Diaries: A Woman’s Chronicle of War and Exile (Vintage, 
2003). 
 
9
 Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’ (1987) 12 Signs 
687, 699–701. 
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Violence has something that birthing inherently lacks. While all humans have 
the capacity for violence, men are born but they cannot give birth. 10  Male 
experiences of birth are, therefore, forgotten, second-hand or downplayed. It is 
this that Cohn seems to suggest the building of weapons, at some level, may 
compensate for.11 This is what Scarry refers to as the ‘unmaking of the world’.12 
Yet even this is a culturally constructed narrative, since men do experience birth, 
as children, partners, fathers, medical professionals, as brothers, uncles and as 
significant others. Even more so than female experiences of birth, men’s 
experiences of birth are hidden in Western communities. 
What does birth, creation, have to do with the international law on the use of 
force? It is through an unhappy coincidence that my birth-day is now shared with 
the most visually confronting act of terrorism known to humankind. The very 
public preoccupation of humankind with violence over birthing is not an 
unhappy coincidence. It is instead something we all play a role in developing and 
maintaining across our lifetimes. This article is about violence, force and 
justifying violence but it is also about creativity and birth — the creation of 
alternative narratives, alternative strategies and an alternative international law 
than the one we see as predominant from our positions in Western communities. 
Arendt defines the creation of new narratives, philosophies and political action 
as ‘natality’, arguing that it is the capacity for natality that makes us human. In 
natality: 
the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because 
the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of 
acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is 
inherent in all human activities. Moreover, since action is the political activity par 
excellence, natality, and not morality, may be the central category of  
political … thought.13 
Arendt’s use of the natal experience as a means of understanding the world of 
political action is instrumental to developing an alternative conception of 
justice.14 If each of us is fortunate enough to hold a newborn baby in our arms 
then we are given the possibility of understanding that all of us are born with full 
rights and no rights. Full rights because the newborn human exemplifies our 
equal origins as crying, thirsty children. No rights because no child survives 
simply through an allocation of rights, but rather through the input of, and 
dependence on, the will of other humans for the provision of basic rights, food, 
shelter, communication and warmth. To have the capacity for individuality and 
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 Apologies for stating the obvious. 
 
11
 See also Klaus Theweleit, ‘The Bomb’s Womb and the Genders of War: War Goes on 
Preventing Women from Becoming the Mothers of Invention’ in Miriam Cooke and Angela 
Woollacott (eds), Gendering War Talk (Princeton University Press, 1993) 283. 
 
12
 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World  
(Oxford University Press, 1985) 22. 
 
13
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 1998) 9. 
 
14
 It strikes me, further, that elevation of the role of natality, to more than the giving birth to 
new humans to encompass the giving birth to ideas and action in the political realm, has the 
potential to challenge cultural norms regarding motherhood and birthing as definitive female 
experiences. By shifting natality away from mothering, action and agency are offered to 
individuals in a radical and challenging manner because Arendt’s conception of natality is 
not an inherently gendered sphere. 
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to be dependent is thus to be born. For international law to move forward it must 
see the dependency and the isolation of individuals rather than continue to 
construct the state in an image of separateness and autonomy. Obama’s 2010 
security strategy moves toward this model when it acknowledges that ‘we must 
recognize that no one nation — no matter how powerful — can meet global 
challenges alone. As we did after World War II, America must prepare for the 
future, while forging cooperative approaches among nations that can yield 
results’ 15  However, the underwriting of this policy with an affirmed 
unilateralism when cooperation is perceived as unproductive16 and an emphasis 
on the achievement of security through military means17 heralds a continuation 
of a view of international subjectivity that asserts the state as the central 
international legal actor and decision-maker, and in a manner that mimics the 
individual as the sovereign actor within domestic legal systems, thus reaffirming 
legal liberalism’s ideology of individualism over the collective. Furthermore, 
while the language of the ‘War on Terror’ has changed under Obama, it is 
important — perhaps fundamental — to recognise that US practice has not. 
In this article, I argue that an analogy exists between pre-emptive force as a 
justification for violence and domestic provocation defences. I argue that the 
analogy is illustrative of contemporary discourse on the use of force functioning 
to reinforce the sexed and gendered model of force found in Western national 
systems. In Part II I review the argument for pre-emptive force, arguments for 
implied authorisation from the United Nations Security Council and arguments 
for a responsibility to protect, as well as recent US practice, so as to highlight an 
analogy that can be made with interpersonal justifications for provocation in 
Western legal structures. I demonstrate how key flaws of the pre-emptive force 
justification are understood through an analogy with provocation laws, 
particularly the incapacity of provocation to be limited by principles of 
proportionality and necessity. I follow this with a review of feminist responses to 
the global war against terrorism. The third section of the article considers how 
feminist methods can challenge contemporary understandings of when the use of 
force may be justified. I reflect on how to rethink the law on the use of force in a 
manner that incorporates understandings of the sex and gender of violence. I 
argue this approach allows us to re-imagine the international and thus re-imagine 
human potential toward a politics of natality. 
II THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
I begin this section with a brief discussion of the global war against terrorism 
and how it was articulated through a range of excuses for the use of force by a 
state. This is primarily evidenced through the US National Security Strategies of  
 
                                                
 
15
 National Security Council, 2010 National Security Strategy, above n 1, 1. 
 
16
 Ibid 22, stating: ‘Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies 
or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave 
humanitarian crisis … [t]he United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if 
necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will seek to adhere to standards that 
govern the use of force.’ 
 
17
 Ibid 18, stating: ‘our military continues to underpin our national security and global 
leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced’. 
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2002 and 2006,18 as well as analysis offered by key (Western) scholars.19 The 
global war against terrorism and/or the ‘War on Terror’ phrase also emerge in 
numerous non-legal discourses, including as a political term used to describe or 
justify US acts of foreign policy: 20  as a socio-legal discourse in Western 
communities justifying the curtailment of civil liberties:21 as media shorthand for 
a range of international events initiated after the terrorist attacks against the US 
in 2001: and as a justification for the use of force in specific conflicts, including 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 22  Iraq, 23  Somalia 24  and Yemen. 25  The global war 
against terrorism was never a legal term, and specific legal  
narratives — pre-emptive force, implied authorisation and the responsibility to 
protect — were invoked to justify the use of force under the global war against 
terrorism.26 In this sense, the global war against terrorism offers an excellent 
example of how legal norms rely on and engage with other normative structures, 
particularly cultural, political and social discourse. The entwining of social, 
cultural, legal and political normative orders also contributes to the regulation of 
                                                
 
18
 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(September 2002) 15–16 <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2002.pdf>; National 
Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America  
(March 2006) 23 <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf>. 
 
19
 See David M Ackerman, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force against Iraq’, 
(Congressional Research Service Report, Library of Congress, United States Congress, 
2003) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21314.pdf>; Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, 
the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September’ (2002) 51 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 401; Michael Glennon, ‘The Fog of Law: Self-Defence, 
Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’ (2002) 25 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 539; Christopher Greenwood, ‘International Law and the 
Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq’ (2003) 4 San Diego 
International Law Journal 7; Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defence 
(American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism Paper Series, American 
Society of International Law, August 2002); Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, ‘The 
Past and Future of the Claim of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense’ (2006) 100 American Journal of 
International Law 525; William H Taft IV and Todd F Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq, and 
International Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 557; Ruth Wedgwood, 
‘The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense’ 
(2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 576. 
 
20
 George W Bush, ‘Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union’ 
(Speech delivered at the US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 28 January 2003): 
‘We’ve got the terrorists on the run. We’re keeping them on the run. One by one the 
terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice.’  
 
21
 Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Hart, 2007); Ben 
Golder and George Williams, ‘Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing 
the Legal Response of Common Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism’ (2006) 8 Journal 
of Comparative Policy Analysis 43.  
 
22
 Greenwood, above n 19. 
 
23
 Ibid. 
 
24
 International Crisis Group, ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?’, 
(Africa Report No 95, International Crisis Group, 11 July 2005); Eric Schmitt, ‘Qaeda 
Leader Reported Killed in Somalia’, The New York Times (New York), 2 May 2008; Xan 
Rice, ‘“Many Dead” in US Air Strikes on Somalia’, The Guardian (London), 9 January 
2007. 
 
25
 Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, ‘US Aids Yemeni Raids on Al Qaeda, Officials Say’, The 
New York Times (New York), 18 December 2009. 
 
26
 On connecting the arguments of a responsibility to protect with arguments made in response 
to the war on terror, see Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’ 
(2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 136; Tal Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of 
State Responsibility (Hart, 2006). 
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women and is therefore of particular interest to feminist scholarship. Through 
looking at the legal implications of the global war against terrorism, and 
arguments made that persistent and low-level threats may justify the use of force 
by states, I argue that an analogy with the rationale of domestic provocation 
defences is apparent. This further illustrates the manner in which international 
law on the use of force can be described as gendered. On the one hand, through 
the assumption of a legal subject that mimics the masculine legal subject that 
legal liberalism utilises as the ‘normal’ legal actor and, on the other hand, 
instrumentalising a gendered understanding of the manner in which violence is to 
be justified, tolerated and regulated. 
A Justifying Violence under the Global War against Terrorism 
The global war against terrorism developed (at least) three types of narratives 
to project legality on to the political rhetoric. The first type of narrative centred 
on prior international legal debates over the possibility of anticipatory force and 
attempts to expand self-defence under the conditions of the global war against 
terrorism to encompass pre-emptive self-defence. That is, the use of force may 
be justified in response to low-level and persistent terrorist threats. The second 
type of narrative focused on past Security Council resolutions and contended that 
states may use force if force can be justified through implied authorisations 
found in prior Security Council resolutions. The third range of narratives argued 
that the use of force is justified in failed states, as well as in response to potential 
threats from rogue states with the perceived capacity to build weapons of mass 
destruction, due to a lack of stable or democratic government. More recent 
articulations of this justification have used the terminology of a ‘material breach’ 
of the Security Council resolutions by Iraq, and thus cast the US-led invasion as 
some form of counter-measure or enforcement tool.27 
Under the first narrative, the controversial customary international law 
category of anticipatory self-defence came to include a narrative on the 
possibility of the use of pre-emptive force to track down, kill or capture the ‘hard 
core of the terrorists’.28 Reisman and Armstrong suggest this is more likely to 
involve ‘strategic preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction or 
terrorist training camps’ than ‘[l]arge-scale attacks on states’.29 This description 
constructs terrorist camps and WMD production facilities as (strangely) outside 
of the territory of states, implicitly suggesting that these are something ‘Other’ to 
the political independence and territorial integrity encompassed by the 
prohibition on the use of force articulated in the Charter of the United Nations 
                                                
 
27
 Evidence to The Iraq Inquiry, London, 27 January 2010, 9 (Lord Goldsmith) 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/45317/20100127goldsmith-final.pdf>.  
 
28
 National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States (March 2006), 
above n 18, 12; this can be compared to the earlier National Security Strategy of the United 
States (September 2002), above n 18, which suggested that the right of states to track down 
and prevent terrorists from acting was even larger in scope. 
 
29
 Reisman and Armstrong, above n 19, 532. 
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(‘UN Charter’) under art 2(4).30 Although the 2010 National Security Strategy 
appears to dismiss the Bush Doctrine, the Obama strategy states: 
The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qa’ida and its terrorist 
affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, we are 
pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the world’s most 
dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa’ida safe haven, and builds positive 
partnerships with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires a 
broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of 
American power — both military and civilian — as well as the concerted efforts 
of like-minded states and multilateral institutions.31 
This somewhat oblique statement must be read alongside continued US 
military strikes in Pakistan and other states identified as harbouring the al-Qaeda 
threat, often through the controversial use of unmanned drones32 that mimics 
rather than rejects the Bush policy of pre-emptive strikes. The Obama and Bush 
justification for these military acts remains that of homeland security. The 2010 
National Security Strategy further states: ‘we are working with partners abroad 
to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders’ while acknowledging 
that ‘[w]e must deny these groups the ability to conduct operational plotting 
from any locale, or to recruit, train, and position operatives’.33 These statements 
avoid direct engagement with the international law on the use of force. US state 
practice since the Obama Administration came to power, however, indicates that 
the perceived terrorist threats abroad have been denied the capacity to materialise 
through pre-emptive strikes on civilian communities.34 
My concern is that the narrative of pre-emptive strikes against terrorist actors 
both centralises the state as the key international actor, and functions through 
recognition of the terrorist actor as outside of the territory of the state — even 
while acting within a specific state — thus functioning to legitimise military 
strikes on the territory of another state. Furthermore, the use of force is not against 
a member state of the UN, but rather against the individual, permitting a threat 
rather than armed attack to function as the justification for unilateral violence. 
This mirrors the gap between interpersonal self-defence and provocation laws 
where self-defence assumes an attack or assault whereas provocation assumes a 
threat. An analogy can then be made with legal discourse that traditionally places 
women’s bodies outside of the remit of laws on assault and battery. Provocation 
laws are complicit in this legal ‘Othering’ through the location of female bodies 
                                                
 
30
 Discourse has also emerged around ‘failed states’ as a site of terrorist activities that 
potentially permit the suspension of art 2(4) protections and the use of force by foreign 
states to target terrorist actors. The Security Council, in its response to terrorism, has also 
shown a willingness to override accepted international norms on non-intervention into the 
domestic jurisdiction of states. See the discussion in Iain Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, 
Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 159. 
 
31
 National Security Council, 2010 National Security Strategy, above n 1, 19. 
 
32
 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Lawful Use of Combat Drones’, Congress of the United States, 
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Hearing: Rise of the Drones II — Examining the Illegality of Unmanned Targeting, Lawful 
Use of Combat Drones, 28 April 2010 <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/ 
042810oconnell.pdf>. 
 
33
 National Security Council, 2010 National Security Strategy, above n 1, 20. 
 
34
 See O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, above n 3. 
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as potentially provocative of male violence and therefore sites where violence 
may be excused or justified.35 Feminist legal scholarship argues that the bounded 
bodies of men represent the normal body of the legal subject so that not only are 
women’s bodies defined as penetrable through heterosexual images of the 
sexualised female body, but law has tolerated physical assaults on women’s 
bodies in private space that would be unthinkable with respect to the bounded 
male body in motion in public space.36  
The construction of terrorist acts in a space outside of the territorial integrity 
defended by the global community of states uses a similar regulative model to 
the provocation defence. Once cast as outside of the ‘normal’ construction of 
(male) legal actors, that is as acting outside the control of any state, it appears 
that terrorist actors can be justifiably attacked for less than an armed attack. At 
the same time, the notion of an armed attack under art 51 of the UN Charter has 
been re-articulated to include attacks from non-state actors, whereas prior to 
September 11 there was an assumption that armed attacks required a link to a 
state to fall within art 51. For example, in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, Gardam found that international law was such that 
it is not clear that the terrorists’ activities against the United States can be 
attributed to any particular State, in which case there is no State-based 
responsibility … [and] there is no right thereby conferred on the injured State to 
use force in self-defence …37 
Article 2(4) defines the parameters of the international legal subject through 
the requirement that force must not compromise a state’s territorial integrity and 
political independence. The use of the imagery of terrorist actors outside of the 
regular (accepted) boundaries of the state thus facilitates the production of a 
justification for violence directed at terrorists, despite the fact that the use of 
force also compromises the territorial integrity of the state in which the terrorists 
are situated. 
Moreover, the threshold for violence directed at the ‘Other’ is lower than the 
threshold triggering justified violence against other legal subjects. That is, the 
pre-emptive force argument projects low-level persistent threats as sufficient to 
justify state force, in contrast to the armed attack requirement required to initiate 
the use of force in self-defence against a state. While the pre-emptive force 
argument is in some ways different to national provocation laws, there remains a 
conceptual analogy in that the two arguments both measure the acceptable 
violence perpetrated by legal subjects and are constructed by perceptions of the 
actors against whom the violence is directed. In national legal structures, 
provocation defences have consistently been developed to justify fatal violence 
against women who pose no immediate threat of violence, but represent a 
                                                
 
35
 See Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation’ in 
Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (LBC Information 
Services, 1997) 149. 
 
36
 Ngaire Naffine, ‘The Body Bag’ in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the 
Subject of Law (LBC Information Services, 1997) 79. 
 
37
 Judith Gardam, ‘International Law and the Terrorist Attacks on the USA’ in Susan 
Hawthorne and Bronwyn Winter (eds), September 11, 2001: Feminist Perspectives 
(Spinifex Press, 2002) 156, 156. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 103 [195]. However, see the 
discussion of Greenwood, above n 19, 16–17. 
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low-level threat to the honour (and often sexual integrity) of the defendant. 
Under international law, the global war against terrorism, scripted as pre-emptive 
force, utilises an analogous model of violence justified against actors within the 
private domain of a state as a means of responding to low-level threats, including 
challenges to the honour and legitimacy of Western hegemony.38 
If the global war against terrorism can be narrated as similar to common law 
conceptions of provocation, questions can be raised about the recent shift in 
many jurisdictions to eradicate and limit provocation defences.39 The changing 
nature of provocation laws in national systems, in addition to the diversity of 
provocation defences across systems, illustrates a clear limitation of the domestic 
analogy that takes a snapshot of either domestic or international laws. In viewing 
the snapshot, temporal and geographical variations are difficult to accommodate. 
For example, while provocation laws have been abolished in some Western 
states, some states have continued to perceive provocation as a mitigating 
defence to homicide, while other states construct honour crimes in a similar form 
to provocation narratives.40 However, this criticism overlooks the purpose of the 
domestic analogy, which is to consider the limitations of the international legal 
system, specifically as they emerge in analogy with national legal structures. In 
this sense, the approach is not constructed to demonstrate the necessity of 
maintaining an analogy between national and international legal structures. 
Furthermore, the use of the domestic analogy as a conceptual tool does not 
preclude other domestic legal structures also being used as tools for measuring 
the strengths or limitations of international narratives. 
With respect to domestic laws on the provocation defence in common law 
states, feminist criticisms have centred on the leniency with which the excuse is 
applied to mitigate domestic partner homicides perpetrated by men against 
women. For this reason Western feminist scholarship has advocated abolishing 
the provocation defence in national legal systems.41 Yet, even when feminist 
challenges to provocation laws have impacted on the structure of law, underlying 
structural biases within Western legal systems have often led to harmful results 
for women and/or non-heterosexual men. For example, Volpp highlights how the 
development of a ‘cultural defence’ in the US to permit a wider variation of 
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actions within provocation defences has reinforced male cultural power while 
negating women’s experience of gender as a cultural condition.42 
In the Australian state of Victoria, the use of a subjective test within the 
provocation defence led to an increased use of the provocation defence to protect 
heterosexual male actors from prosecution for violent and fatal attacks on 
homosexual men and to justify the killing of women by men overcome with 
jealousy.43 As a consequence, the Victorian Parliament abolished the defence of 
provocation and the Victorian Attorney-General at the time stated, ‘the defence 
of provocation promotes a culture of blaming the victim and has no place in a 
modern society’.44  The Victorian provocation defence was replaced with the 
defence of ‘defensive homicide’, however subsequent analysis has suggested that 
the change in the law has not brought a change in the types and range of 
defendants successfully arguing defensive homicide. 45  The disproportionate 
number of male defendants arguing the defence appears to reflect complex social 
and cultural norms surrounding male and female violence. In the UK, the 1991 
case of R v Thornton 46  demonstrates this well. In this case the defence of 
provocation was rejected by the court due to the time between the provocation 
and the subsequent killing, although the provocative violence existed within a 
setting of long-term domestic violence inflicted on the defendant. At a retrial, 
however, the defendant’s murder conviction was quashed after the defence 
brought fresh medical evidence demonstrating a personality disorder suffered by 
the defendant as a result of the domestic violence she had experienced. That is, 
the female violence in this case was neither excused nor justified, but rather 
explained as abnormal behaviour as a result of a problem with the defendant’s 
mental capacity rather than as a result of the long-term violence of her partner. 
This contrasts with UK cases where the provocation defence has been 
successfully argued by men who have killed an intimate partner. In these cases 
the behaviour of the deceased is seen to have provoked male violence, and thus 
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functions to excuse the loss of self-control by the defendant.47 The successful use 
of provocation by men as an excuse to murder has ultimately led to a reform of 
provocation laws in the UK and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) 
abolishes the defence of provocation48 and replaces it with the defence of loss of 
control.49 The widespread acceptance in common law states of the gendered 
limitations of the provocation defence, as well as the additional social and 
cultural norms that continue to inform the range of contemporary excuses, 
alludes to the gendered social, cultural and legal assumptions that flow into 
constructions of the international excuse of pre-emptive force. 
The analogy between pre-emptive force and provocation defences also 
demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of the pre-emptive force argument. The 
justification fails to adequately set restrictions on force, in terms of 
proportionality or necessity, as this is akin to the gendered subjectivity that has 
marred application of the provocation defence.50 The pre-emptive force argument 
justifies the use of force through an assumption, made by the state using force, 
about the future motives of the individuals killed in any pre-emptive attacks. 
This is a form of ‘blaming the victim’ in the sense that terrorists are held 
responsible for the use of force used to destroy them or, in the words of the 2009 
US Administration, ‘we have a clear and focussed goal: to disrupt, dismantle and 
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either 
country in the future’.51 This unusual euphemism for killing terrorists (‘prevent 
their return’) is formulated in parallel to domestic provocation justifications: the 
suspected terrorist actor is blamed for low-level, persistent provocation in order 
to justify the extreme use of force and a circumvention of both international and 
local criminal justice standards, and to halt the violence of individual (non-state) 
actors. 
The second justification for the use of force articulated by the US within the 
narrative of the global war against terrorism encompasses the possibility of 
implied authority from the Security Council. After the failure of the US and its 
allies to discover WMD in Iraq, perhaps due to the ongoing violence within the 
Iraqi state, this implied authority is a common justification given for the invasion 
of Iraq in March 2003. 52  Security Council Resolution 1511 endorsed the 
presence of the Multi-National Force in Iraq from October 2003;53 previously, 
however, excuses and justifications articulated by states and scholars had 
focused on (the much older) Security Council Resolution 678 to gain legal 
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credibility for the use of force in Iraq.54 In 2010 the UK government articulated 
this as occurring through a ‘material breach’ of the Security Council resolutions. 
This narrative, apart from its spurious legality, invokes a sense of provocative 
behaviour by the rogue state that, although not immediately threatening to the 
hegemon, provokes the use of violence through the continual defiance of the 
hegemon’s demands (although such demands were originally articulated through 
the institutions of the UN). 
The 2003 use of force in Iraq illustrates the limitations of a provocation-type 
justification for the use of force, as well as the intrinsic difficulties of equating 
security with military force.55 Unilateral state assessment of the magnitude of 
threats posed by Iraq proved to be vastly overestimated. This diminished the 
claim that the use of force in 2003 against Iraq had been necessary and 
demonstrates an analogous feature of the implied authorisation 
argument/justification with the provocation defence in domestic legal structures: 
the choice not to act through the collective security structure is, in the implied 
authorisation argument, bolstered by the self-belief (of the UK and US) that the 
collective security structure condones the action and thus legitimates the 
violence. Similarly, provocation defences imply a self-belief by the aggressor in 
the acceptability of individual acts of violence which gain retrospective 
legitimacy through the collective legal structure. Responsibility for the violence 
is ultimately attributed to those against whom the violence is directed. For the 
husband or partner whose honour is challenged by the sexual activity of his 
wife/girlfriend/ex-lover, it is her behaviour that justifies and provokes his 
violence, which is assumed to be sanctioned later by the community through the 
legal defence of provocation. In the implied authorisation/material breach 
example, the rogue state’s assumed and continual violation of an international 
norm/expectation/regulation justifies and provokes the powerful state’s future 
violence, because of the legitimate belief of the actors in the validity of their 
acts, eventually sanctioned — or at least not condemned — by the international 
community through legal means. 
The hindsight offered by the failure of the US and its allies to find WMD in 
Iraq emphasises the accuracy of Brownlie’s curiously predictive 1961 
assessment of pre-emptive force justifications as ‘extremely vague’ such that 
‘any act or omission by the authorities of a State could be regarded as 
provocation if it displeased a powerful opponent’.56 
In addition to the regulative analogy, the consequent social, cultural, legal and 
economic consequences for women after the use of force in Iraq in 2003 
illustrates how military force — whether authorised, justified or  
illegal — contributes to, rather than eliminates, threats to women’s security. The 
current status of women in Iraq exposes the insecurity resulting from the 
justification of the use of force as implied authorisation. Al-Ali and Pratt  
have found in their research on the condition of women in Iraq after the US-led 
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use of force that: 
Iraqi women are not suffering because of anything specific to Islam. They are 
suffering because there is a staggering amount of violence on all levels and no 
functioning state to provide security, services, and adequate humanitarian 
assistance. No-one is willing or able to guarantee and implement women’s legal 
rights. The legal rights enshrined in the contested constitution are flawed to start 
with and do not promote equal citizenship. Iraqi women are also deprived because 
of widespread and crippling poverty, large-scale unemployment, and lack of 
access to adequate resources.57 
As the US and its allies embarked upon their withdrawal from Iraq in 2010, the 
focus of US foreign military action has centred on Afghanistan and the 
destruction of the Taliban and al-Qaeda actors along the northern Afghan and 
Pakistan border. Despite continued violence in Iraq, Western media has 
re-focused on the Afghan–Pakistan violence. As Western attention and the forces 
themselves shifted, the Obama Administration utilised the rhetoric of women’s 
rights to underscore the nature of the threat in Afghanistan and Northern 
Pakistan.58 The rhetoric of women suffering and under threat from Islamic power 
is used to supplement the image of terrorist provocation justifying US force in 
Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. This occurs without reflection on the role 
that the US and its allies have played in contributing to the insecurity in 
women’s lives and the refraction of women’s rights in Iraq. The failure to see the 
impact of the use of force in Iraq on women’s rights, and women’s lives, returns 
us again to the unsatisfactory nature of the implied authorisation argument that 
cannot engage a notion of proportionality as, like the authority, the threat is 
implied. 
Through contrasting the narratives about women in Iraq and women in 
Afghanistan, the underlying gendered performance of international law is 
revealed. The prevalent international narrative on women’s rights in Iraq is one 
of formal equality, as international representations focus on the instability of the 
state formed after the US-led invasion to justify the use of coalition troops to 
monitor the re-structuring of the Iraqi state. A formal equality narrative ignores 
the daily insecurity that Iraqi women navigate and the role that a return to 
religious legal structures in the area of family law (amongst others) will play in 
the future (in)security of Iraq women.59 In Afghanistan, where illustrating the 
instability of the state is an important aspect of the narrative justifying the 
continued use of (Western) force, women’s vulnerability is brought to the fore, 
not as an issue in and of itself, but rather to anchor the justification for the use of 
force. Feminist approaches to international law must look beyond the rhetoric of 
the global war against terrorism to articulate strategies that challenge women’s 
insecurity from the domestic to the international sphere. The insecurity of 
women in Iraq is linked to the insecurity of women in Afghanistan, and also to 
the gendered narratives that confine and restrict women’s capacity to be agents 
for change in Western states. I return to the role of women’s participation in 
challenging the international law on the use of force below. 
                                                
 
57
 Al-Ali and Pratt, above n 55, 166. 
 
58
 Kellerhals, above n 51. 
 
59
 Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam 
and Women’s Rights’ (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 503. 
2010] Feminist Reflections on the ‘End’ of the War on Terror 15 
The third type of legal argument enlarged in the context of the global war 
against terrorism engages the narrative of failed states that is apparent in 
international legal discourse since the end of the Cold War but has become 
specifically connected to the use of force in the era of the global war against 
terrorism. Under this narrative, suspected terrorist actors on a foreign territory 
become factors assisting identification of the status of a state as failed and as 
symbols justifying the use of force.60 In 1993 the Security Council identified the 
Libyan government’s failure to renounce terrorism as a threat to international 
peace and security, leading to the imposition of sanctions by the Security 
Council which were not lifted until 2003.61 However, after the instigation of the 
global war against terrorism, this narrative shifted considerably, as the US sought 
to justify unilateral military action with the targeting of terrorists in failed states. 
For example, the US used force intermittently after 2007 in the ‘failed’ state of 
Somalia, suggesting that the identification of failed states may permit a softening 
of international regulations with respect to the principle of non-interference in 
other states.62  The continuing use of unmanned drones by the US to attack 
terrorist actors in the northern regions of Pakistan, the 2008 attack on Syrian 
territory, and the December 2009 attacks in Yemen have also been justified 
through the representation of the territory subject to force as outside of the 
control of the sovereign state.63 
A similar narrative is presented with respect to rogue states that are perceived 
to be developing weapons of mass destruction. For example, Feinstein and 
Slaughter argue in favour of a ‘duty to prevent’ that is articulated through a 
comparison with the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ narrative, claiming that: 
Humanitarian protection is emerging as a guiding principle for the international 
community. In the same vein, we propose a duty to prevent, as a principle that 
would guide not only the Security Council in its decision-making but also 
national governments in shaping foreign policy priorities … Ours is not a radical 
proposal. It simply extrapolates from recent developments in the law of 
intervention for humanitarian purposes … [t]he corollary duty to prevent 
governments without internal checks from developing WMD …64 
The proposed duty to prevent includes the possibility of the use of unilateral 
force by states to prevent threats from developing. Although yet to be articulated 
by a state in the language of a duty to prevent, the articulation of what is 
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described as ‘the law of intervention for humanitarian purposes’ illustrates how 
the argument, on the one hand, utilises a past narrative (on humanitarian 
interventions) while consciously changing that narrative (describing this as law). 
While the Responsibility to Protect and subsequent institutional documents 
embracing the Responsibility to Protect model affirmed the UN Charter, as well 
as human rights laws, to articulate the new narrative, both the failed state 
discourse and the duty to prevent narrative shift away from the UN Charter 
significantly.65 This cannot be produced by a solely legal narrative; rather, the 
legal narrative is bolstered by social, cultural, political, even economic narratives 
that reproduce the fear of the Muslim terrorist or of the rogue state developing 
WMD to ultimately justify preventive, forceful responses to future potential 
provocations. 
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, articulated by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, maintains a focus on states 
while giving the appearance of addressing private/domestic violence within a 
state. 66  The failed state narrative furthers this insufficient understanding of 
addressing non-state actors on the international plane. The Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine originates in concerns for non-state actors at risk from violations 
either tolerated or enacted by the state itself. In contrast, the failed state narrative 
targets non-state actors themselves, circumventing the complicity or 
responsibility of the state the non-state actors are operating from and 
consequently circumventing the potential of other areas of international law to 
challenge, prevent or combat terrorism. The turn to the use of force through 
narratives of failed states replicates the provocation defence in national legal 
structures which permit the legal subject’s subjective assessment of a situation to 
define an event, regardless of whether that assessment coheres with the agreed 
norms of the legal community. 
Behind each of these arguments stemming from the global war against 
terrorism, there is a repetition of narratives demanding a response to low-level 
but persistent threats, such as that posed by transnational terrorism. However, the 
US government reports that 72 066 individuals were targeted by terrorists, 
globally, during 2007. Of this figure, 19 individuals were private US citizens, all 
of whom were in conflict zones at the time of the recorded attack. The report 
further records that approximately half of the individuals targeted by terrorist 
acts were of Muslim faith and nearly 100 mosques were attacked during 2007.67 
This data quite clearly illustrates the low-level threat of terrorism, at least to 
Western states, despite its persistent nature. 
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As a common law defence to homicide, mitigating murder to manslaughter, 
the provocation excuse until recently existed in England for defendants 
who, without acting out of a considered desire for revenge: (1) killed only in 
response to gross provocation; and/or (2) killed only in response to a fear of 
serious violence in circumstances where someone of the defendant’s age and of an 
ordinary temperament might have reacted in the same or a similar way.68 
Since February 2010, the United Kingdom Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
(UK) has replaced the common law on provocation with the new partial defence 
of loss of control. That is, previous provocation law in the UK developed to 
define the defence through the acts of the deceased or the defendant’s perception 
of deceased’s behaviour even in the absence of actual violence on the part of the 
deceased. The new UK provision under s 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 replaces this test with one that requires a qualifying trigger. Section 55 of 
the Act identifies a qualifying trigger for the defence of loss of control as a fear 
of serious violence under s 55(3), circumstances of an extremely grave character 
under s 55(4), or a justifiable sense of being wronged on the part of the defendant 
under s 55(5). In both the common law defence of provocation and the new 
statutory offence of loss of control, the defendant’s perception of a future threat 
(a fear of serious violence) is essential to the successful pleading of the defence. 
This parallels the international articulation of the pre-emptive self-defence 
justification where a state’s perception of the threat of global terrorism is utilised 
to justify the use of force on foreign territories. However, the UK shift to the 
‘loss of control’ test demonstrates the normative weakness of a parallel 
international defence for the use of force because it is difficult, if not impossible, 
for a state to claim a loss of control in the process of the deployment of military 
force.  
Furthermore, unlike domestic law, international law does not recognise the 
legal distinction between an excuse and a justification. The constitution of 
provocation as an excuse rather than a justification for homicide is relevant in 
terms of the analogy with international pre-emptive force. As an excuse, the 
provocation defence mitigates rather than absolves criminal responsibility. In 
this sense, the act remains illegal but the perpetrator is treated with leniency due 
to the mitigating factor of the provocation. Provocation as a partial defence and 
excuse, rather than justification for killing, acknowledges that the behaviour is 
wrongful and illegal. Under international law, arguments for the right to use 
pre-emptive force function in a similar manner, as the US, at least since 2006, 
has not argued for a right of pre-emptive force as a widespread justification for 
the use of force available to all states akin to the right of states to use force in 
self-defence under art 51 of the UN Charter. Instead, the US argued for a right to 
use pre-emptive force in the special circumstances of a global war against 
terrorism that is directed at the specific provocation/threat of future terrorist 
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attacks by Islamic terrorists against Western territories.69 This is articulated as a 
justification rather than an excuse, as the latter concept has not been an aspect of 
the international system. However, pre-emptive force — and, it might be added, 
humanitarian interventions — demonstrate a move away from justifications 
towards the less satisfactory category of excuses if viewed through a domestic 
analogy. 70  The discursive consequences of this shift have not yet received 
thorough attention in international legal discourse. 
Additionally, the consequential social narrative that focuses on a fear of future 
provocative/violent behaviour to justify increased infringements of civil liberties 
by the state can be highlighted as analogous to the internalised social discourse 
many women experience in response to male violence. Feminist writing that 
emerged in the weeks after the September 11 attacks in the United States 
emphasised this connection between the internalisation of the fear of male 
violence by women and the internalisation of fears of the ‘Other’ in the guise of 
the Muslim terrorist within Western communities. For example, Morgan records, 
on 19 September 2001, the necessity to 
talk about the need to understand that we must expose the mystique of violence, 
separate it from how we conceive of excitement, eroticism, and ‘manhood’; the 
need to comprehend that violence differs in degree but is related in kind, that it 
thrives along a spectrum, as do its effects — from the battered child and raped 
women who live in fear to an entire populace living in fear.71 
An important aspect of the analogy between the global war against terrorism 
and provocation defences, then, lies in the strong social narratives of fear and the 
consequential curbing of liberties and agency. For women, provocation 
narratives are co-opted into women’s self-blame for men’s violence. This results 
in the refusal by many (Western, middle class) women to walk at night, or to 
move in public spaces unaccompanied, due to the fear of rape or attack from an 
unknown male assailant. This is despite intimate relationships forming the key 
global threat to women.72 In the West, after the instigation of the global war 
against terrorism a similar fear was enacted culturally against the idea of the 
‘unpredictable’ Muslim terrorist.73 This narrative, similar to discourse on the 
threats to women’s safety, misallocates the source of the fear as external, the 
‘Other’, the irrational Muslim terrorist, denying the role Western imperialist 
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strategies play in contributing to poverty and violence in foreign states and 
downplaying the threat of terrorism to Muslim communities outside of the 
West.74 This discourse also collapses complex religious and nationalist identities 
with racial and ethnic identities. It should be noted that this is more than a social 
or cultural narrative as laws have been implemented to detain individuals who fit 
the profile of the Western conceived image of the terrorist, although these 
infringements of civil liberties potentially apply to all citizens. For some writers, 
this is a necessary sacrifice of liberal freedoms for the goal of greater security.75 
The impact of the global war against terrorism for Western citizens becomes 
the narrative warning of the threat of future violence rather than actual persistent 
violence. This justifies those of us in Western communities averting our attention 
from ‘Other’ violences and justifies governments in Western communities 
curtailing civil liberties. As a New Yorker, Morgan wrote in the weeks after the 
September 11 attacks: ‘[t]he world’s sympathy moves me deeply. Yet I hear 
echoes dying into silence: the world averting its attention from Rwanda’s 
screams’.76 That the use of force impacts on those inflicting the force is not a 
new narrative; Weil writes of the recognition of this in the Iliad: 
Force is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its 
victims; the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The truth is, nobody really 
possesses it. The human race is not divided up, in the Iliad, into conquered 
persons, slaves, suppliants, on the one hand, and conquerors and chiefs on the 
other. In this poem there is not a single man who does not at one time or another 
have to bow his neck to force.77 
Weil’s analysis of the Iliad illustrates that which is hidden in the law on the 
use of force: not only does endless articulation of justifications (or excuses) 
ignore the consequent harm, violence, death and suffering that force inflicts but 
those using force are equally harmed because ‘at all times, the human spirit is 
shown as modified by its relations with force’.78 Through the global war against 
terrorism, the two way impact of force resounded in Western communities. One 
consequence was the reinforcement of polarised gendered identities and a 
gendered division of labour that militaries function within. Thus under the 
narratives of the ‘War on Terror’, women’s roles, in relation to military actors, 
are encapsulated by female stereotypes of women requiring protection, women 
as wives and mothers and women as providers of sexual and domestic services. 
The sex and gender of laws, exposed by the domestic analogy, connects with 
the understanding of law’s function as a social and cultural narrative. The US 
discourse on the global war against terrorism, in an effort to build a legal 
narrative, utilises social and cultural narratives linking international and national 
legal structures. Although an increasingly accepted legal narrative regarding 
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pre-emptive force, implied authorisation and a responsibility to prevent became 
apparent in mainstream international discourse during the years of the Bush 
Doctrine, an exclusive focus on these narratives ignores the feminist and critical 
voices that challenged this narrative as a corruption of international law. It is 
these alternative narratives to which I now turn. 
B Feminist Responses to the Global War against Terrorism 
Scheherazade breaks the cycle of violence by choosing to embrace different terms 
of engagement. She fashions her universe not through physical force, as does the 
king, but through imagination and reflection.79 
After the acts of 11 September 2001 and the instigation of the US global war 
against terrorism, feminist scholarship emerged (occasionally) in support,80 in 
opposition and in analysis of this Western narrative. 81  In this section I 
concentrate on feminist legal responses to the global war against terrorism and 
post-September 11 narratives. In examining feminist responses to the global war 
against terrorism I indicate the wider possibilities — and limitations — of 
adapting feminist approaches to international law and to understanding the 
international law on the use of force. My purpose is to reflect on how the global 
war against terrorism narratives significantly disrupted any larger feminist study 
of the law on the use of force during this period. I argue that international legal 
developments that acknowledged the relevance of feminist approaches and 
women’s participation during the 1990s were either sidelined by the global war 
against terrorism narrative or developed through the production of restrictive 
categories of female victim-status. 
I have three arguments that I wish to bring to the fore under a feminist 
narrative on the global war against terrorism. First, alongside the limited 
narrative of terrorist actors as rogue male actors functioning outside the 
boundaries of the state, are images of women’s sexual vulnerability and need for 
protection that miscast the threat to women’s sexual autonomy as also outside 
the state. This has recently emerged in specific international legal acts, notably 
from the Security Council. I argue that the production of a restrictive female 
sexuality, vulnerable to attack from rogue male actors, is a reiteration of the 
sexed and gendered discourse which was prevalent in security discourse prior to 
the global war against terrorism. Consequently, initiatives such as Security 
Council Resolution 182082 on women, peace and security do little to challenge 
the underlying legal structure that is inimical to women’s security.83 Underlying 
this restraint is the feminist methodological limitation related to the construction 
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of a feminist ethics. While feminist analysis of sex and gender is sophisticated 
and multifaceted, bringing this knowledge to law often collapses categories and 
reinstates binaries that feminist legal theorists have worked toward dismantling. 
Secondly, subversive feminist accounts in response to the global war against 
terrorism, alongside other critical and/or subversive approaches, became difficult 
to articulate when the dominant Western narrative appeared to function to reject 
international legal norms. Not only are there multiple alternative narratives, but 
law, as a discipline, effectively screens out radical alternative narratives precisely 
because of their status as narratives. 
The third argument contends that Western feminist approaches in the era of 
the global war against terrorism were unable to significantly contribute to the 
debate because of the fundamental lack of discourse within feminist approaches 
to international law regarding when, if ever, force would or could be justified. 
This is consistent with the overall conclusion of this article that posits that 
feminist approaches enlarge our understanding of the law on the use of force, and 
that the consequences of this knowledge are relevant for the development of 
feminist legal theories and for international legal approaches generally. For 
example, the possibilities of a feminist re-imagining of the base of international 
law through a politics of natality, and the importance of seeing force as 
impacting upon the communities that force is directed at and from where force is 
directed. 
Under the first argument, what is notable about institutional responses to 
women’s issues after 11 September 2001 is the entrenched association of women 
with peace alongside elaboration of women as a category of protected (usually 
sexualised) subjects.84 The anti-terrorism narrative, which revolves around the 
dynamic of the rogue terrorist versus the just male warrior, also functions as a 
gendered discourse. To complete the narrative of the violent male actor 
represented in Western states as the transnational terrorist, the increasing 
emergence of images of the female mother/child/victim requiring protection is to 
be expected. Post-9/11 institutional developments used gendered representations 
of women’s sexual vulnerability and consistently suppressed the agency of 
women in a retrograde manner.85 Placed alongside the gendered image of the 
Muslim terrorist, it is not surprising that the narrative of male violence 
expounded under the global war against terrorism is contemporaneous to projects 
that centre on women’s sexual vulnerability rather than female empowerment or 
agency.86 Facilitating the increasingly sexualised representation of women under 
international law is a general neglect of women’s participation and agency. 
A further consequence of the discourse on the global war against terrorism is 
the averting of attention from women’s rights and women’s participation at the 
international level. The Secretary-General reported in September 2008 that 2.2 
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per cent of UN military personnel were women.87 At one level this demonstrates 
the inadequacy of Security Council initiatives such as Resolution 132588 which is 
constructed under ch VI of the UN Charter as a soft, or non-binding, resolution, 
and is therefore without compulsory norms for the active participation of 
women. As a consequence, there is little incentive for states to make changes to 
the profile of military communities. Feminist approaches to international law, 
however, demand a more sophisticated analysis. The reliance by the UN on 
statistical articulation of gender parity indicates a fundamental failure to see 
feminist awareness as requiring more than adding women to existing security 
strategies. Furthermore, the dependence on militaries as the key strategy to 
challenge insecurity indicates a larger failure to see the structure of militaries as 
complicit in the production of women’s insecurity. 
The expansion of Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in 
Resolution 1820 and Resolutions 188889 and 188990, refines the approach of the 
Security Council from one focused on addressing a wide range of issues to a 
strategy centred on sexual violence in conflict zones.91 The narrowing of the 
Security Council focus links women’s peace and security with sexual 
vulnerability. Resolution 1820 also transfigures the possibility of future force to 
challenge sexual violence.92 The reduction of the Security Council attention to a 
linkage of women’s sexual vulnerability with potential military actions miscasts 
the causal element between military action and sexual violence, presenting the 
possibility that military action might halt, rather than function as a cause of, 
sexual violence, exploitation and abuse. 
The only prevalent alternative image of women present in international 
security literature and institutional acts assumes the success of feminist and 
women’s movements, prescribing women’s formal equality as a marker of 
democracy. In this sense the juxtaposed images of the Western woman, the free 
citizen/actor in a liberal democratic state, beside the non-Western woman, 
vulnerable to sexual violence, exploitation and abuse that is prevalent in conflict 
zones, ignores the agency of the latter and the sexed and gendered notion of 
freedom available to the former. In this sense current institutional moves, such as 
Security Council Resolutions 1820 and 1888, parallel the global war against 
terrorism articulation of the non-Western rogue male actor with the vulnerable 
non-Western female victim. The only acceptable Western feminist narrative, in 
this context, is the narrative of Western women ‘saving’ non-Western women 
through the institutions of international law. While it is possible to situate these 
two narratives alongside the ‘War on Terror’ era, the ‘end’ of the Bush doctrine 
appears to have led to a furtherance of these two models of female citizenship; so 
that the Obama era may be thus far characterised as focusing on sexual violence 
in conflict zones alongside the exponential rise of the Western gender expert in 
international institutions. 
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Secondly, alternative feminist responses to the legal narratives embedded in 
the global war against terrorism narrative become increasingly difficult to 
articulate in a cultural environment that rests on the refrain, ‘[e]ither you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists’.93  The occasional legal engagements from 
feminist legal theorists headed in two directions during the ‘noughties’: the first 
category of feminist writing centred on the reiteration of a legal status quo while 
the second category of feminist writers focused on the production of non-legal 
materials to make critical sense of the legal narrative on terrorism. For example, 
under the first category, Gardam provides a response that applies a formal legal 
reading to diminish the viability of the rhetoric that emerged from the US, and its 
allies, after the September 11 attacks94 Under the second approach, Charlesworth 
and Chinkin invoked social and cultural knowledge to challenge the narrative of 
the global war against terrorism; similarly, Buchanan and Johnson gave a 
subversive non-legal account that engaged narrativity, law, film theory and 
gender theory in order to understand the West(ern) preoccupation with violence 
and law’s foundation.95 Buss also utilised a narrative approach to engage the 
multiple narratives that emerged in international legal scholarship otherwise 
limited to a dichotomy between US unilateralism and the cosmopolitan ethic of 
the international legal order.96 Similar then to George W Bush’s decree, ‘you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists’, critical feminist writing produced a split: 
you are either with the formalists, reinforcing the ‘good’ and ‘moral’ basis of the 
existing international order, or you are with ‘them’ — a category encompassing 
US defenders of the global war against terrorism at the expense of international 
law. For feminist and critical theorists in Western liberal democracies, this 
created a dilemma in that the mainstream was often posited as the only 
alternative to a pro-Bush/global war against terrorism stance. The consequence 
was a reduction of debates and answers to the legal questions produced in the era 
of the ‘War on Terror’ to a dichotomy between texts re-imagining international 
law (constructed by those developing the global war against terrorism narrative) 
and texts asserting the relevance of the status quo of international law, which are 
represented as the only ‘other’ space for discourse. 97  The assertion of a 
mainstream (or formalist) return to the key values of the UN Charter, or 
international law, leaves little space for feminist approaches to international law 
that are premised on the possibility of re-imagining international law’s core. 
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For Orford, drawing on the work of Charlesworth, the fake crisis of a 
dilemma posed between the global war against terrorism and the perceived 
canons of international law acts as a ‘founding’ moment that ultimately reasserts 
the legitimacy and potential of international law.98 Described in this way, the 
global war against terrorism is demonstrated as a crucial initiatory moment or 
foundational discourse, a re-affirming of the discipline of international law. We 
should not be surprised, in this sense, to find feminists, women, critical theorists, 
writers from the global south, postcolonial theorists and third world approaches 
excluded from the dialogue.99 The Western discourse that responds to the 9/11 
attacks, and mobilises a forceful solution, becomes, then, not the founding 
moment but one founding moment amongst many in a discipline that asserts its 
legitimacy and authority through crisis.100 In a text written prior to the ‘War on 
Terror’, but with increased relevance since, Rajagopal writes: 
This is nothing but a retelling of that old problem in international law: how to 
establish order in a world of sovereign states. But at a deeper level, this is a 
problem faced by law in general: on the one hand, law needs to constitute itself as 
the ‘other’ of violence to be legitimate, on the other hand, the law needs to use 
violence instrumentally to preserve power. The contradictions created by this 
paradox become part of the constant crises of law.101 
For feminist theory this reading, on the need for crisis and the role of the 
crisis moment as a foundational narrative, illustrates a methodological abyss in 
feminist approaches to international law. As a theory that posits an alternative 
vision, indeed the possibility of a restructured international legal order 
responsive to feminist knowledge, feminist theory has been able to partake in the 
unearthing and exposure of the discursive violence associated with foundational 
narratives in law. What feminist legal theories have failed to do is indicate 
whether a re-imagined feminist international order must also assert a 
foundational narrative and whether that narrative is implicitly violent.102 Law 
and violence jurisprudence, for example the work of Robert Cover, argues that 
founding law is to enact violence.103 If feminist politics is a quest for a new 
founding moment, can the violence be in the act of severance from past 
narratives or must feminist theory take the further step and use force? To 
articulate the range of feminist positions on when, if ever, force may be justified, 
the relationship between law, violence and gender requires increased 
engagement. 
                                                
 
98
 Anne Orford, ‘The Destiny of International Law’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 441. 
 
99
 For a ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (‘TWAIL’) analysis of the global war 
against terrorism, see Symposium, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law after 
9/11’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1. 
 
100
 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 65 Modern Law 
Review 377. 
 
101
 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘International Law and the Development Encounter: Violence and 
Resistance at the Margins’ (1999) 93 American Society of International Law Proceedings 
16, 22. 
 
102
 But see Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of 
Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) ch 6. 
 
103
 See the discussion of Robert Cover’s work in Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical 
Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Hart, 2005) 69–74. 
2010] Feminist Reflections on the ‘End’ of the War on Terror 25 
Specific feminist responses to the global war against terrorism circle these 
questions. For example, MacKinnon argued as early as 1992 that an international 
feminist approach would justify the use of force in the former Yugoslavia to halt 
the horrendous sexual violence and rapes.104 After the September 11 attacks, 
MacKinnon finds: 
It is the ‘war on terror’ that is the metaphor — legally a mixed one at  
that — although its pursuit has been anything but, and violence against women 
that qualifies as a casus belli and a form of terrorism every bit as much as the 
events of September 11th do.105 
MacKinnon’s work comes close to suggesting a feminist response to violence 
against women may be the controlled violence of legal coercion. At this point, 
the global war against terrorism highlights a crucial methodological limitation 
that is yet to be theorised or discursively engaged with by feminist approaches to 
international law. That is, if alternative narratives, or alternative institutional 
structures, are an implicit aspect of the feminist legal project, then the 
relationship between law and violence needs to be embraced or rejected — or, at 
the very least, cease to be avoided in feminist scholarship. If we sever the 
assumptions of a feminism ground on peace work, feminism must confront her 
own violence as an aspect of the human proclivity for violence. 106  This 
encounter, by definition, also interrogates the association of masculinity with 
war and the warrior. Even if feminist legal theory rarely condones or justifies the 
use of force between states, unanswered questions remain about the larger 
complicity of law in gendered violence. Feminist legal theories must 
acknowledge that a re-imagined international legal structure needs to address the 
relationship between law and violence to understand the further association of 
law, violence and gender. Although this article is unable to answer this question, 
it concludes with the placing of the question at the forefront of future feminist 
approaches to international law. 
I have indicated Arendt’s political model of natality as a potential feminist 
framework to build new narratives on force. However, as a non-legal narrative, 
the radical potential of Arendt’s insightful work is difficult to accommodate in 
the contemporary international legal structure. This difficulty demonstrates the 
limitation of the law as a narrative technique that is at once ‘inside’ (as it 
engages with the existing mainstream of international law) and ‘outside’ (as it 
posits solutions that engage discourses and narratives outside of law’s 
disciplinary boundaries). 
Feminist approaches to international law must, first, engage directly with the 
question of why a critique and challenge of the international legal edifice should 
be mounted, if it is only to find a deep rooted structural bias that potentially 
negates any future project. Secondly, feminist approaches must respond to the 
claim that law itself may be the ‘gentle civiliser’. The use of the law as narrative 
technique throughout this article has been, in part, a choice made to illustrate the 
view that current international legal arrangements need not be the only 
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international legal arrangement. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Otto, 
feminist approaches must function as projects ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the 
mainstream of international law to provide long-term, productive engagement 
and solutions.107 The second claim, on the potential of law to restrain war and 
armed conflict, can only be made by blinding ourselves to the realities of armed 
conflict for women living in conflict regions and the impact of force on those of 
us living in communities who justify the use of force on the territory of another 
state. Furthermore, law that seeks to restrain armed conflict through controlled 
force rests on a fundamental error about the possibility of military violence to be 
controlled, rational or useful for the creation of women’s security. 
 
III FEMINIST STRATEGIES IN THE OBAMA ERA 
Beyond the global war against terrorism, the Charter-based norms on the law 
on the use of force, as well as the customary international law perceptions of 
justified force, require sustained feminist engagement. This article has examined 
the arguments that construct justifications for the use of force under the US-led 
global war against terrorism, as well as feminist discourse in response to the 
global war against terrorism. This final part enlarges the argument that feminist 
legal theories must look at laws beyond the global war against terrorism 
discourse to re-examine the law on the use of force generally. 
The first two claims discussed here — the demand for an increase in women’s 
participation in security mechanisms, and the need for an elaboration and 
development of the prohibition on the use of force — are directed at feminist 
strategies that function ‘within’ the mainstream of international law. Both of 
these recommendations, however, must be read within the context of the 
arguments for a politics of natality discussed above. In this sense I acknowledge 
that any reform strategies are of limited value in a system that is structurally 
sexed and gendered. By drawing conclusions that pertain to the development of 
laws as they currently exist, alongside conclusions that challenge the edifice of 
international law generally, I utilise Lacey’s critique/utopia/reform model and 
Otto’s recognition of the ‘inside–outside’ status of feminist legal theories.108 
Arguments for the increased participation of women in international security 
mechanisms are cogent with the general focus of the article. This should not be 
regarded as a quota-type strategy. While the empirical, or substantive, aspect of 
the participation claim lies in recognising the relative absence of women in 
international and national decision-making structures, my own strategy for 
addressing this absence would be to address the incorporation of women’s 
narratives from outside of the mainstream of international law to explain, analyse 
and challenge the international law on the use of force. The methodological 
aspect of participation claims is to replace demands for gender equality, in terms 
of women’s representation, with a more sophisticated approach to women’s 
participation in international and state structures. The latter would involve 
seeking out women’s understanding of their own and society’s needs, as well as 
                                                
 
107
 Dianne Otto, ‘A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation 
of Security Council Resolution 1325’ (2006) 13 Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 113. 
 
108
 Ibid; Nicola Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women’ in Karen Knop (ed), 
Gender and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2004) 13. 
2010] Feminist Reflections on the ‘End’ of the War on Terror 27 
understanding the role of women on the ‘peripheries’ in challenging social, 
cultural and legal norms.109 To seek women’s full participation in legal processes 
is, therefore, to embark on a (slow) reworking of legal structures and normative 
categories. 
Consequently, the pursuit of women’s participation shifts beyond quotas 
towards recognition of the failure of current legal arrangements to be inclusive of 
women at the foundation. Underlying this conclusion, then, is recognition that 
the ‘foundations’ of international law are neither settled or permanent but 
gendered and socially constructed. Furthermore, my claim is not that women’s 
experiences and knowledge are innately different to men’s, but rather that 
women’s experiences and knowledge are informed, globally, by social and 
cultural norms that result in women having different priorities and needs from 
those of men, as well as from other women. Reflecting the cultural diversity of 
women’s experiences and knowledge, as well as the socially constructed spheres 
of reference understood as female, demands a re-working of fundamental legal 
categories and processes built on women’s participation that goes well beyond 
proportionate representation. 
Beyond the move to incorporate a conceptual shift in understanding how and 
when women could and should participate in international decision-making, my 
second claim is that the preoccupation of states and scholars with the articulation 
of justifications, rather than the prohibition on the use of force, is instrumental to 
the perpetuation of the use of force by states.110 The placement of art 2(4) as the 
epitome of state agreement on the nature of prohibited force reflects the legal 
positivist origins of the international legal structure. As the reflection of a 
specific theoretical perspective on law, the prohibition provides a marker of the 
legitimacy of the international legal structure. Rather than perceiving art 2(4) as 
the pinnacle of human creativity in the outlawing of violence, time would be 
well spent on elaboration and development of what it means to have a 
prohibition on the use of force, its limits, its regulation and its cooption into a 
gendered understanding of law and violence. This coheres with a politics of 
natality that acknowledges the capacity for new ideas (birth) as the essential 
characteristic of the human condition. 
Other attempts to expand the contours of the art 2(4) prohibition, such as the 
Definition of Aggression111  and the Declaration of Friendly Relations112  are 
marked as historical attempts that add little in the contemporary setting and, at 
the time of their articulation, were circumscribed by political realities. The 
achievements of the International Criminal Court Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression in 2010113 are not inclusive enough to offer a genuine or 
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workable elaboration of the prohibition and re-iterate the Definition of 
Aggression rather than re-model this area of international law. Although 
institutional reports, such as the More Secure World Report114 and In Larger 
Freedom,115 have addressed the international law on the use of force, this has 
been to enlarge and develop justifications rather than to strengthen the 
prohibition. In contrast, the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence 
annexed to the Great Lakes Peace and Security Pact,116 while not without fault, 
utilises three separate provisions to articulate what it means to prohibit the use  
of force on the African continent post-millennium. In the Protocol on  
Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence, states agree to the following: 
1. The Member States undertake to maintain peace and security in accordance 
with the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great 
Lakes Region, and in particular: 
a) To renounce the threat or the use of force as policies means or 
instrument aimed at settling disagreements or disputes or to achieve 
national objectives in the Great Lakes Region; 
b) To abstain from sending or supporting armed opposition forces or 
armed groups or insurgents onto the territory of other Member 
States, or from tolerating the presence on their territories of armed 
groups or insurgents engaged in armed conflicts or involved in acts 
of violence or subversion against the Government of another State; 
c) To cooperate at all levels with a view to disarming and dismantling 
existing armed rebel groups and to promote the joint and 
participatory management of state and human security on their 
common borders. 
d) If any Member State fails to comply with the provisions of this 
Article, an extraordinary Summit shall be convened to consider 
appropriate action.117 
While the Pact does face immense implementation difficulties, it stems from 
the cooperation and consultation of heads of states, governments and 
communities in the region and is supplemented by further Protocols extending 
meanings and expectations for states. As a regional document, the Great Lakes 
Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence may be inappropriate for 
direct transplantation into the international collective security structure and it 
does not explicitly address women’s security, 118  but it does illustrate the 
potential and capabilities of states choosing to work to eradicate rather than 
justify conflict. 
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My recommendation, to develop the legal finesse of art 2(4), is in contrast to 
the increasing emphasis placed on justifications and is voiced in the context of 
further recommendations regarding women’s participation and agency. To 
develop the legal finesse of art 2(4) would require recognition of the inadequacy 
of the prohibition because it has been consistently read as accommodating 
justifications for violence that utilise Western patriarchal justifications to 
underpin their normativity. Development of the prohibition would therefore 
require strategies that seek to disassociate constructions of the nation-state under 
international law from understandings of the Western sexed legal subject. 
Consequently, what begins as a strategy ‘within’ the contemporary contours of 
international law also requires a larger feminist project of re-imagining the basic 
premises that shape international normativity. Underlying this claim is an 
expectation that a renewed focus on the prohibition encourages peace-building 
initiatives and preventative strategies. 
Moreover, a review of the 2009 report of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression demonstrates the limitations of contemporary institutional 
endeavours with respect to women’s participation.119 The low representation of 
women in the drafting and the subsequent negotiating stages is fundamentally 
circumscribed through the absence of recognition of the impact of gender on 
security, and of the relationship between law, gender and violence. Moreover, 
the definition of aggression recommended by the Special Group uses the words 
‘the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state’.120 This proposed definition focuses on 
interstate violence that is retrograde in terms of contemporary understandings of 
violence and aggression, and fails to recognise critical and institutional 
knowledge of the limitations of security mechanisms that neglect to respond to 
the relationship between women’s insecurity and state insecurity.121 
In addition to these specific recommendations, the article makes the following 
general observations and conclusions. Primarily, justified violence within legal 
discourse has been constructed through gendered understandings of legal 
subjectivity. Underlying this knowledge are embedded assumptions, at least in 
Western legal liberalism, regarding the nature and capabilities of the (sexed) 
legal subject. Consequently, feminist legal theories that challenge the sexed and 
gendered representations of justified violence within national legal structures 
provide a useful starting place for a domestic analogy. This is an analogy in 
terms of the regulation of violence, and helps to expose how persistent dilemmas 
will remain unresolved without attention to the gender of justified violence under 
law. This conclusion is of relevance to feminist approaches to international law 
and to mainstream scholars. Mainstream international legal actors can learn from 
feminist debates on essentialism122 and law as a narrative.123 This knowledge 
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addresses the limitations of Western discourse (including within this article) and 
the necessity of perceiving law as a narrative with multiple interpretations and 
meanings. This allows for attention to the necessary generality of any narrative 
and the attendant problems of traversing the particular and the universal in legal 
accounts. My approach to these limitations has been to reiterate the need for the 
Western subject/author/perspective to be analysed in terms of her own 
subjectivity. In this article, I have begun a feminist dialogue on how, as 
Westerners, our culture impacts on constructions of international law on the use 
of force, and how sex/gender play a central role in Western cultural and legal 
accounts, specifically through a project of acknowledging the regulative analogy 
between provocation and pre-emptive force. 
Feminist strategies for change also acknowledge the unpredictability and thus 
the limitations of solely legal reform. In this sense the search for articulations of 
political theories that re-imagine the relationship between the state and its 
subjects or, under international law, the state as the legal subject, are necessary. I 
have suggested Arendt’s natality model as one potential site for this type of 
work. Other post-liberal articulations of legal subjectivity, such as contemporary 
work on the vulnerable subject, might also offer relevant contours to 
re-imagining international legal subjectivity. 124  However, these remain 
extensions and refinements of the project discussed across this article. With 
respect to the law on the use of force, the claim is that a return to the prohibition, 
rather than increased articulations of justifications, would signal a return to the 
reduction and limiting of force that coalesces with feminist expectations of 
international security. 
Finally, this article has considered the global war against terrorism as a 
narrative akin to Western cultural narratives on provocation that have been used 
to curtail women’s movement in public space. The analysis of provocation 
narratives highlights the continued sex and gender of post-9/11 developments in 
the law on the use of force. I have also used this discussion to indicate the 
limitations of the feminist tools used across the article. Of particular concern, 
with regard to the use of a narrative approach to explain law, is the consequential 
level of generality and the invocation of stereotypes to expose the weaknesses of 
legal narratives. This may play a role in disguising discrepancies in narratives 
and the capacity for subversive narratives to be articulated alongside, and 
sometimes within, dominant narratives. A further limitation of the law as 
narrative approach is the risk of contributing to stereotypes of masculinity and 
femininity rather than challenging essentialism. I have sought to disrupt this 
consequence of gender narratives, but I acknowledge that the very articulation of 
the words, ‘gender’, ‘sex’, ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘women’, ‘men’, ‘female’, ‘male’, 
‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ plays a role in enshrining sexed difference in 
discourse. However, this is also a representation of the gendered reality within 
which we live and enact laws. I have also considered the next step for feminist 
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approaches to international law with respect to the international law on the use of 
force, recognising the necessity of further dialogue on what it means to 
re-imagine international law and law’s foundation. 
With respect to the domestic analogy, a key limitation of the approach is that 
the whole article becomes tied to Western constructions of law, ignoring 
analogies between international legal forms and non-Western legal structures, as 
well as those outside of the common law model. This has implications for 
feminist approaches to international law and for international legal discourse. For 
feminist legal theories, Murphy’s question about the methodological choices 
feminist theories make, and the prolonged association of feminist approaches to 
international law with the tools of Western feminist legal theories, require 
greater attention.125 While it may be that feminist approaches to international law 
will need to develop their own range of tools to engage a sustained discussion 
with international law, there are some problems with this approach because 
international law itself is so heavily coopted into a projection of Western legal 
methods and regulatory practices onto conceptions of the international. For 
mainstream scholars, the questions Murphy asks of feminist legal scholars 
working within the discipline of international law need to be spotlighted on the 
construction of the international legal subject, so that the personification of the 
state as the international legal subject, and the composite sexing of that subject, 
gains increased interrogation and critical engagement. The purpose of the 
domestic analogy is not to endorse the analogy but to open the topic for critical 
engagement and to argue that feminist legal theories offer useful tools for 
developing hypotheses. It may be that answers, however, extend beyond the 
remit of feminist legal theories as other vectors of difference beyond sex and 
gender (certainly race, culture, ethnicity and sexuality) are developed as 
necessary narratives within international jurisprudence. 
To conclude, the purpose of this article has been to identify the legacy of the 
‘War on Terror’ for feminist approaches to international law, specifically the 
international law on the use of force. The parallel between the ‘War on Terror’ 
and domestic provocation laws aids identification of the gendered paradigms 
within which legal justifications for violence are deployed. The domestic 
analogy also highlights the sexed model of legal subjectivity that international 
law assumes through the parallels with Western liberal models for the regulation 
of violence. Although the narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ appears to have been 
relinquished by the Obama Administration in the US, unmanned drones continue 
to be used as a form of ‘justified’ force against the potential provocations of 
suspected terrorists around the globe, women in Afghanistan continue to see 
their security needs utilised as a justification for military force while women in 
Iraq suffer increased insecurity and violence as a result of the Western military 
intervention and, at the institutions of the UN, Western women arrive as ‘gender 
experts’ to be deployed to conflict zones around the world to save the sexually 
vulnerable women of other cultures. In these senses the ‘War on Terror’, and its 
consequences, remain a fundamental part of the international security landscape. 
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